Time is the penultimate problem in philosophy. The meaning of Time that can be given by current Astrophysics is superficial at best. After Gödel, it can be argued that any science based on the sensorium has profound metaphysical issues. Since Mathematics must be employed in present cosmogony, the longstanding issues surrounding what mathematical truths and numbers are, and where they exist, does little to deliver meaning to Time. In Philosophy, many have elaborated their philosophy of Time and some have addressed the significant impact of the future in those discussions. The problem of evil, or theodicy, is thought to be the most difficult problem in philosophy. This essay proposes to coalesce the problems of Time and Theodicy. The predominate linear view of time obfuscates our understanding of time as well as the implications of the problems of evil. The Platonic concept of anamnesis as the primacy of Time is adapted here. We are already complete but we unfurl in Time because we have forgotten how we created ourselves. Time is the record of our moments, our deeds; what we have volitionally done. Omniscience knows this; we forgot and now live that forgetfulness. A Book of Life is written, we cannot recall our page number.
Past thinking dismissed physics or astronomy as irrelevant to metaphysics or theology. This eventually paved the way for science to dismiss philosophy as meaningless, mandating that philosophy take into account the natural sciences; particularly physics and/or astronomy (Inge, 1934) . While science makes metaphysics suffer for its longstanding meddling (Gilson 1944); Laszlo (1960) contends the theoretical edifice of theology is not radically different from that of science. Carr (2014) illustrates that cosmology relates to philosophy and theology and develops in time; and Craig (2010) calls out an intimate and profound connection between cosmology, metaphysics and the philosophy of time. Nevertheless, contemporary outlooks in science and mathematics shed little understanding on those views.
Little is empirically understood about the origin of the natural universe (Panel Reports, 2011) . It is currently believed that the natural universe had a beginning (Gruszczak, 2014) .The current predominant cosmological singularity; the Big Bang model-states that the universe was started instanteously; in the shortest fraction of a second from a miniscule point where all matter, energy, time, space and existence emerged (Carr, 2014: 408) . Afshordi and Magueijo (2016) argued that empirical progress in any such cosmogony (e.g., dark matter, dark energy, modified gravity, etc.); have their concomitant theoretical understanding lingering significantly behind. Furthermore, the theories that are related to these fail to exhibit any predictability; while the parameters they manifest lead to a "vast array of disparate possible models". They also note that several major features of the Big Bang remain unexplained: why does the universe look the same over such vast distances, why is it so large and why does it have the shape it has? P. Davies (1998) asks how did the universe arrive in the first place and if inflation was predominate what happened before that? However, the most common strategy is to avoid the how and why of cosmology & metaphysics and turn to language, to logic to experience to phenomena and to the structures of texts (Timmann, 2008) . Why has "the necessity for explicitly restating the question of being been completely forgotten today" Heidegger (1962)? Accordingly, Hawking (1988) and Scientism (Williams and Robinson, 2015) contend that since we cannot determine empirically what happened prior to the Big Bang, (T=0); any prior events (T -0 ) have no real meaning. Schelling (2000) would disagree since he states "that there is a question so natural that it is already raised in childhood: what kept God busy before God created the world"? Origen (2013) also asks what God was doing before the world began?
Modern cosmogonists face a similar problem when dealing with questions about what happened before the 'Big Bang'. To account for such issues several great physicists, argues Zwart (1976) have stepped over their disciplinary boundaries and have engaged in metaphysical speculation and, for the most part, reflect epistemology and not physics (i.e., Einstein's analysis of the process of measuring time, Born's reflections on cause and chance, Bohr's writings on the subject of complementarity and Heisenberg's analysis of the process of determining the position and momentum of an elementary particle). According to Heidegger, science does not think because it does not know what it means by what it does (Michalson, 1963) .
Comte renounces all these inquiries as "a vain search for the origin of the universe since in the Positive stage, the mind has finally understood the impossibility of grasping absolute notions" (Lowith, 1949) . Royce (1898) thinks this Positive Philosophy of Comte reflects a superficiality of thought. While Comte, says Marcel, was served by his total incomprehension of psychical reality (Sweetman, 2011).
To the point of any inquiry, Collingwood (1998) states that every question involves a presupposition. Von Bertalanffy notes that any observational statements already presuppose an accepted conceptual universe (Blauberg, et al 1977) and that perceptual cognition is not a reflection of real things nor is knowledge an approximation to truth or reality (Von Bertalanffy, 1975) .
Other implications regarding the Big Bang origin of the universe mandate that an interaction between astrophysics and mathematics is necessitated (Sakellariadou, 2014 ). For Heisenberg (1958 , in theoretical physics, mathematical symbols are correlated with facts "namely the results of measurement". Reichenbach states that if there is a solution to the philosophical problem of time, it is written down in the equations of mathematical physics (Griffin, 2016) . Most often today, time is thought to be simply empirical measuring. This view is a pointless metaphysical presupposition that will be shown to have contributed at best, incomplete meaning for these efforts. It would be interesting to see what those physicists would think about recent developments in astrophysics, specifically the well-known and frequently used a priori applications in it as pointed out by Schmidt (2015).
Mathematics (and therefore its mandated implications for astrophysics), has been shown by Gödel to lack final systemization and is not free from internal contradiction (Nagel and Newman, 2001) . Consequently such Noncontradiction, or Truth of a system, cannot be formalized within that particular system (Janicaud and Mattei, 1995) Mathematics also engages us into a current issue regarding numbers. Craig (2010: 541) asks Hawking what physical reality corresponds to the mathematical notion of imaginary numbers? Hacking (2014) inquires whether numbers are abstract objects (after Whitehead and Platonism) or do they even exist at all? Kant (1891) claimed that at the foundation of mathematics lays, a priori, pure intuitions. Hilbert thought that, in principle, we know a priori that every mathematical question is decidable by an intuitive proof or disproof (Kripke,1987) . Gödel, like others, contends that numbers are a second plane of reality, as objective as nature (Tieszen, 2011) . For Penrose too, they are a world distinct from the physical one (d'Espagnat, 2006) . Gödel also expected that a more fundamental theory was lying ahead, which corresponded to his ideal of a stepwise approach to the things in themselves-be it part of a mathematical world or Platonic Mathematical Truths (Stoltzner, 2014) . Such a world would not be foreign to Royce (1898) who called arithmetic a fact and a sort of extra-human reality, which can be referred to as a truth.
What are these truths, where are they and what is their meaning? Planck (1963) argued that, in theoretical physics, the assumption that there exist real events not depending on our senses which must in all circumstances be maintained. Wittgenstein and Carnap, not unlike Heisenberg, Reichenbach and others; would likely offer that, only those statements which could be verified are meaningful (the Verification Principle) which itself cannot be verified (Pannenberg,1988) . Carnap (1956) asks where these truths like propositions, relations, properties and numbers originate? Would Samuel Johnston still say these days that he refutes Bishop Berkeley by kicking the mighty stone (Boswell,1791); now possibly thought to be composed of a monopole configuration which is U-dual to the brane configurations (Aharony, et al 2008) ?
What similar stones, paradigms or other abstract entities, and particularly mathematical ideas are forthcoming and are they discovered or invented (Mazur, 2008)? Was the Earth really flat until a newer and better "empiricism" found Newton then further discoveries led to General Relativity and Quantum Physics? Where did any of these latter ideas exist in reference to any former times? Similarly, where were Gödel's Theorems, Black Holes, Dark Energy, Pi Squared and Zero? Empirical science models and theories are consistently orphaned then completely abandoned when they are replaced by the as yet undiscovered paradigms Kuhn (1962) . Where were they previously? Were they Platonic forms specifying possibilities for their instantiations just waiting somewhere in time (Gale 1991)? Or for Eddington, such events do not happen, they are just there and we come across them (McCall, 1994) .Were they already existent and formed for mankind to discover them; from wherever -in time? Were they non-existent (or nothing), or out of time and thus meaningless? Or were they just forgotten?
Can any science of perception be free from its own systemic contradictions unless a concept is added to it that deals with the relations that are not formalized within that system? Given such a Gödelian view, how can any science of phenomena be free from noncontradiction and where meaning is in general "uncomputable" (Goertzel, 1994) ? The most one could hope for is that the commonly accepted axiomatic-axiomatizations are only incomplete and not inconsistent (Livio, 2009) .
Nevertheless, as we cannot determine empirically what happened prior to the Big Bang, (T=0); any prior events (T -0 ) have no real meaning (Hawking,1988) . Following this line of thinking: T -0 → T=0 ≡ ( T past + T present + T future +T or not future ). Does meaninglessness (T -0 ) produce meaning (T=0)? If Meaninglessness produces Meaning; has Astrophysics reached its epistemological limit? Can science, at best, only yield consistency? Neither can answer why there is time.
There is a subjectivity of time and an objectivity of time. We are all in it and it is in the common sense measurement of it; which eventually leads to an overstatement of its epistemological and ontological position that T -0 is meaningless.
And if meaninglessness does produce meaning, what about Time; since it is alleged that there was no time prior to the Big Bang?
Generally, from Boethius (1957) onward, time is viewed from the present into the past and projected into the future. Swinburne (1994) also agrees that Time is linear.
There are many who disagree.
That Number is Time was a tenet of Greek philosophy from Plato & Aristotle onwards (Hannah,2009) . Plato also argued all learning is recollection while the being of anything can be known only through this recollection (Cohen, 2006) and this comes from anamnesis (Allen,1959).
Einstein stated that "the distinction between past, present and future is only a stubbornly persistent illusion (Bennet, 2014).
Popper (1972) cannot accept this "distinction doctrine" as he states that even an illusion is, qua illusion, a real illusion.
For Kant the concept of time is merely contained in a "whole of time" (Kanterian 2018).
Hegel proposes time as that being which, in as much as it is, is not, and in as much as it is not is (Hammer, 2011) .
For Schelling, the self itself is time conceived of in activity. (Matthews,2011) .
Merleau-Ponty offers that the time that science provides is only a measurable abstract notion of time, wrongly initiated with abstractions and not experience (Low,2013) .
For Whitehead, time is a perpetual perishing (Johnson, 1962) .
For Broad, the present is a kind of ontological gateway through which events must pass to become real (Ismael, (2012) .
Whitehead also contends a general reference to "Beyond" in the event is a must to have any reference at all (Bogaard & Bell 2017) .
Hartshorne says the future has no reality except in anticipation (Neville,1993) .
But this anticipation, according to Scheler, can show that time can flow from the future back onto the present; like the soldier expecting sacrifice (Frings,1997) .
Also participation in baseball and other sports is completely based on the decision of anticipation (future) on which the "present" ball is hurled from another players "past"?
Plotinus (1918) contends that what exists potentially does not become what exists actually but from what was previously a potential (a statue) proceeds from what later is actual (statue) Heidegger (Being and Time:447) states the past of Dasein is something that already goes ahead of It, often referencing Its "futural" character.
Bertalanffy (1975) portrays a philosophy of Nicolas of Cusa, which relates that whatever we do or think has been in us, i.e., a latency.
Both Whitehead and Merleau-Ponty accept nature as an unfurling (Low, 2013) .
Schelling argued that the ruling dimension is the future that is "properly speaking the time in time (Matthews, 2011: 214-5).
From Kant (1970) ; "our earthly life…is ever only a becoming…and should be credited to us exactly as if we were already in full possession of it".
Or Hegel (1975) ; everything that has happened (including all the deeds of time) are the struggles of an alienated and divided Mind to find and return to itself.
Curiously, Heidegger asks Who is Time, not what time is and presupposes that Time is a being or entity (Massey, 2015) . Some contemporary positions also fluctuate widely in their philosophy of time:
For Pannenberg,(1969); appearance is the arrival of the future appearing to me as precisely that which is, something more that it is as it presently appears to me.
Rogers (2014) asks if the future exists now? T1 = present. T2 is future time. DoesT2 exist at T1? Yes if we mean that at T1, T2 exists. No if we mean to say at T1, T2 exists.
Sprigge contends that the contrast between past-present-future is less then it seems (McHenry, 2010) From McTaggert (1908) we have the unreality of time and consequently the A, B, C's of Time (Gale, 1968) . McCall (1994:195-197) .describes his branching view of time where all branching lies exclusively in the future, not in the past or present but are not abstract but concrete.
The motion of time has two movements, procession and return; the way forward is the way back, the way back is the way forward (Wolfson, 2005) .
To Leftow (1991) , events occur in the frozen simultaneity of eternity , but also follow one another in time. If there is no such thing as time in the usual sense (Raschke 1980); Perhaps we need a new philosophy of time? (Pannenburg, (1988) .
Prior
It is little wonder then that Bergson contended that "the problem of Time is the central crux of philosophy and excepting the problem of evil, it is the hardest in all of philosophy (Inge,1934: p71) .
By accepting the predominant linear conception of time, we obfuscate our understanding of evil. Time is anamnesis. We recollect and discover our currently forgotten; but simultaneously created free-self. We are complete yet we forgot how we did it. Time flows backwards and not forwards.
Time is anamnesis. We live, remember and recall. Time is the record of our moment; what we had volitionally done; the logical consequences from our now. That now is unfurled from anamnesis. Omniscience knows this; we forgot and now live that forgetfulness.
Augustine might call this remembering of our past Illumination (Hoitenga, (1991) .Yet Pattison (2015) objects to such views since how do we know that God knows all at once? Plantinga would retort "God knows the truth value of all F-conditionals prior, either in the order of time or as an explanation to His creative decision" (Gale, 2007 ).
Yet, according to Aquinas and de Rivo, agrees Prior (2003:58) ; God cannot know future contingencies when they are still future and contingent that is impossible. Furthermore, even if such were known yesterday, God would be merely guessing correctly. So like Ockham, Prior agrees it is impossible to express the manner in which God knows future contingencies. (Prior 2003:49-50) .
Unless, that is, Time is the rewinding of the Divine "VCR/DVD" as we are shown ourselves to ourselves.
But what about evil in Time, in the Divine VCR, in this life of recollection of ours? How can an All Good, Omniscient and Omnipotent God allow evil?
According to Jaspers, the attempt to solve the problem of evil is ungodly (Macintosh,1940) . Kant eschews metaphysical questions of theodicy (DiCenso,2015) . Whitehead's Theodicy denies Omnipotence, as God can only function as a persuasive agency (Barmeau,1991) . Royce (1998) states we regret evil has "being". Swinburne (1998) says that lacking a theodicy, evil counts against the existence of God. H. Davies (1992) , while investigating traditional defenses of God, notes that if the road to hell is paved with good intentions, the road to heaven is paved with failed theodicies. To elaborate on the many positions in Theodicy, Herman (2000) presents a very thorough historical and constructively critical overview of the background of the problem of evil from Plato onward; classifying potential Theodicy solutions into no less than 21 descriptions. Scott (2015) concludes by maintaining any Theodicy must answer essential questions. Scott's themes shown here will be presented followed by replies.
Theme 1: What are The Origin, Continued Existence and Permission of Evil: Plantinga (1967) argues that God cannot create the possibility of moral evil and simultaneously prohibit its actuality…so some of the creatures exercised their freedom to do what is wrong: hence moral evil. Caputo contends that God as creator was working with elements that signified a certain limit on Gods power (DeRoo, 2010) . Leibniz (1952) argues that "God could not give the creature all without making of it a God" . Augustine's student, Prosper, details that "God in creating the universe could not have made a repeat of himself…as a consequence, all creatures have a limited operation…consequently the evils to which all creatures are subject is metaphysically necessary so that even God's omnipotence can make it not be (Rosmini, 2009 ).
The origin of evil is presented from the inability of God to create a clone, as it were, of God. Consequently the non-clone exercises free will and does so very poorly, creating moral evil. Subsequently, the natural consequences of those choices are established. Those are the instantaneous evolutionary creation of the rewind of the Divine VCR. We now stand at the par eschatological moment (after Hicks 1994). The logical consequences are natural evils viewed therefrom. The show has stopped, we forgot that and create the continued existence of evil in our place within the VCR. Any and all prohibitions against any expression of free will, no matter how egregious are forbidden there.
Theme 2: How does evil pose a problem for theology?
A few of these range from the "escamotage" of Christian Theology is to solve the drama of divine justice (Massimo, 2002) to Galbraith (2006) propounding Roth's anti-theodicy of God; who is everlastingly guilty-where the degrees here run from gross negligence to murder; and Schellenberg (1993) the weakness of evidence for theism is itself evidence against it, that is, why would God be hidden from us? Further, Flew (1992) declares the sense of the word "God" has to rest on the proposition "God" so defined and in what sufficient reason is there to believe from the sense of the word God" that there is one?
For language, Flew can be basically asked the same questions as posed by Heidegger (2009) like what is the human being (Heidegger, 2009: p27)? Since the being of a human being is determined with reference to the being and essence of language; and that language distinguishes the being of the human being; we now see a very awkward circular argument (Heidegger, 2009:24-25) . Another question; what is speaking (Heidegger, 2009:29) ? Also, we have no answer, since we answer that which we ask about (Heidegger 2009,:59) . Moreover, does language rest on an Gödelian incompleteness? If mathematics is in another plane of Reality, is God? Like arguments before, how can human language be free from its own systemic contradictions unless a concept (God) is added to it; that deals with the relations that are not formalized within that system? God might also be hidden or veiled from us due to either intentional (culpable) receptivity or unintentional unreceptivity, not to mention that not all people experience that problem (Meister,
